COVERITLIVE.COM

12:57

J.J. Huggins - Welcome to today's live chat with Merrimack College Professor Curtis Martin. We will begin discussing North Korea and Iran at 1 p.m. Martin is an expert in foreign relations with both countries.

12:57

J.J. Huggins -

Please feel free to post questions and comments throughout the chat.

12:59

Curtis Martin - Hi JJ. It's good to be with you.

1:01

J.J. Huggins -

Here we go. Let us start with North Korea. What can you tell us about the missile tests they conducted over the weekend, and how is that going to impact the international community's diplomacy with them?

1:03

J.J. Huggins -

While Professor Martin types, here is some background information about him:

Curtis H. Martin biographical information

Curtis H. Martin is Professor of Political Science at Merrimack College in North Andover, Massachusetts, where he teaches US Foreign Policy, International Relations, and Comparative Politics. He holds the Ph.D. from Tufts Fletcher School. Publications include: "North Korea’s Negotiating Position During Fifteen Years of Chronic Crisis," in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., North Korea’s Foreign Policy Under Kim Jong Il: New Perspectives, New York: Ashgate, 2009; "‘Good cop/bad cop’ as a model for nonproliferation diplomacy toward North Korea and Iran," Nonproliferation Review, 41,1 (2007); "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Under George W. Bush: A Critical Appraisal," in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security, (New York: Ashgate, 2007). "Going to the United Nations: George W. Bush and Iraq," Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University; "The Sinking of the Ehime Maru: Interaction of Culture, Interests and Domestic Politics in an Alliance Crisis." Japanese Journal of Political Science, 5, 2, 2005; "Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework." Journal of Peace Research, 39, 1, 2002; "Negotiating with Adversaries after the Cold War: Incentives-Based Diplomacy in United States-North Korean Relations," in A. Cooper Drury and Steve Chan, eds., Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, MacMillan, 2001; "Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement as a Nonproliferation Tool," The Nonproliferation Review, 6,4 (Fall, 1999):35-51; Martin and B. Stronach, Politics East and West: Political Culture in Japan and Britain (Armonk, NY: M.E

1:04

Curtis Martin - Back in 2006, the North Koreans also tested missiles on the Fourth of July, only then they were long range missiles--much more of a concern to the US and North Korea's neighbors. The missiles this weekend were short range missiles. The launch was an effort to defy the United States, specifically, but also to defy the United Nations resolutions of 2006 and recently this May that forbid the North Koreans from testing missiles. In a way, there is some reasurance that the North did not choose to test the more threatening long range missiles. When taken with the recent decision of the North to have a cargo ship return to port--we were monitoring it for illegal trade--there may be a sign that the North is retreating from its recent bellicosity just a bit.

1:06

J.J. Huggins - Why won't they just comply with the U.S. and other countries and simply halt their missile tests? What do they have to gain from being so provocative?

1:11

Curtis Martin - First some background. North Korea is an extremely proud, nationalistic state, but one that since the Korean war has feared the United States. Beginning in the late 1980s, the North began to resolve some of its fears by getting the United States to end what they called its "hostile policy." Oddly, the way they chose was to start a program of nuclear energy that had the potential to
be diverted to nuclear weapons. The US negotiated an agreement in 1994 whereby the North would freeze and eventually dismantle its program in exchange for US security guarantees, diplomatic relations, economic incentives and a promise that we would provide it with new, safer nuclear reactors.
That agrement broke down when George Bush became president. The North resorted to its favored tactic of threats and escalation to get the attention of the US and force it to negotiate again. Bush eventually did, and we got another set of agreements in 2007. The North was dragging its feet on implementing these because it still feared that the US had evil designs upon the regime. They only have nuclear weapons and missiles with which to pressure other countries.
Otherwise, they are a small, relatively week country unable to feed their people.
So, the tests and bluster are a way of getting attention of stronger countries.

1:13	[Comment From Rosemary] Hi everyone. Dr. Martin, what sort of sanctions are in place now against North Korea?

1:16

Curtis Martin - Rosemary, the United States has kept in place economic sanctions on trade, investment, travel and other transactions since the end of the Korean war.
For a long time, however, the North could make up for that with trade from other countries, notably China. Since the North Koreans' nuclear test in 2006, the United Nations has added sanctions that forbid the North from testing nuclear weapons or missiles, and call on it to give up its nuclear program. As a result of these sanctions and the recent UN resolution 1874, countries are called on not to trade or conduct financial relations that might be used for the missile or nuclear programs. The sanctions allow the tracking of North Korean ships, and sanctions against companies doing business with the North.

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